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F O R E W O R D 
The adoption of the Young Plan for the settlement of the repara-
tion question in Europe and the establishment of the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements are events of profound importance which should 
contribute materially to the re-establishment of a reasonable rate of 
progress in world trade. 
As a creditor nation we should bear our fair share of the burden 
of rehabilitation. We should know what our commitments are under 
it. We should be aware, most especially, of the change in the situ-
ation that has been brought about by the current settlement with Ger-
many, and of the advantages to American foreign trade that should 
accrue from it. 
Mr. Auld's address at the Seventeenth National Foreign Trade 
Convention at Los Angeles is an admirable statement of the practical 
factors of agreement and co-ordinatiom. which have been brought to 
bear by the Young Plan on the whole world trade situation. It is a 
real contribution to one of the vital phases of American foreign trade 
policy. 
J A M E S A . F A R R E L L , Chairman, 
National Foreign Trade Council. 
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Second Printing, August, 1930 
T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L B A N K A N D T H E 
R E P A R A T I O N S S E T T L E M E N T 
B y G E O R G E P . A U L D 
O f Hask ins & Sel ls , N e w Y o r k 
former ly Accountant-General of the Reparat ion Commission 
G o i n g back as far as the foundation of the B a n k of E n g l a n d i n 
1694, we f ind that the exigencies o f w a r or the clearing away o f its 
aftermath have occasioned the establishment of three out of the f o u r 
leading central banks of the w o r l d . T h e B a n k for International 
Settlements, w h i c h now l inks them up, has a s imi lar o r i g i n . It was 
conceived by the Y o u n g Committee to a id i n the solution of post-war 
financial and monetary problems, by act ing as trustee of the reparation 
plan and by p r o v i d i n g convenient means for cooperation between cen-
t r a l banks, there being at present no less than 34 such institutions, of 
w h i c h 11 were created since the W o r l d W a r . 
E v e r y great conflict has t h r o w n a cr i t ical s train on the exist ing 
mechanism of c iv i l izat ion, and new and improved instruments have 
been called into being to c a r r y the strain and a id i n reconstruction. 
M a n y such emergency devices have proven long-l ived. E a c h new era 
of peace, f o l l o w i n g on reconstruction, has witnessed a m a r k e d acceler-
ation of the n o r m a l pace of h u m a n affairs. T h e new pace has t h r o w n 
new burdens on the institutions of society, and the emergency i n s t r u -
ments have surv ived as indispensable units i n the machinery of the 
new regime. S u c h a career f o r the new B a n k was expressly foreseen 
by the Y o u n g Committee. 
I n the year that has elapsed since this project was launched, an 
extensive l iterature of controversy has already g r o w n up around it . 
T h e new institution has been both denounced as a super-bank and de-
rided as a cipher. Its structure and control have been harshly 
c r i t i c i z e d ; some of its functions as reparation trustee, notably i n con-
nection w i t h the proposed sale of bonds, have been attacked; and its 
broad general powers as a potential central bank of central banks have 
been the object of furious controversy. B u t the project has m o v e d 
along over a l l hurdles, and the B a n k has now begun to funct ion at 
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Basel , under the chairmanship of M r . Gates W . M c G a r r a h , u n t i l re-
cently C h a i r m a n of the F e d e r a l Reserve B a n k of N e w Y o r k . 
T h e B a n k is incorporated under a special act of the Swiss federal 
assembly, embodying a treaty between S w i t z e r l a n d and the s i x found-
i n g nations, Great B r i t a i n , France , Germany, I ta ly , B e l g i u m and 
Japan. 
S t r u c t u r e of t h e B a n k 
F i f t y - s i x per cent of the capital was allocated i n seven equal parts 
to the central banks of the s i x founding governments, plus a n A m e r -
ican banking group, consisting of J . P . M o r g a n & Co. , the F i r s t N a -
tional B a n k of N e w Y o r k , and the F i r s t N a t i o n a l B a n k of Chicago. 
U n d e r the charter, the A m e r i c a n group may at any t ime be replaced 
by the F e d e r a l Reserve B a n k of N e w Y o r k , i n the u n l i k e l y event that 
our government should reconsider its disapproval of Reserve B a n k 
part ic ipation. T h e m i n o r i t y interest of for ty- four per cent i n the 
capital of the B . I. S., as the B a n k is col loquial ly k n o w n , w i l l be con-
tributed by the smaller central banks. 
W h i l e the stock w i l l be resold to the publ ic , vot ing powers w i l l re-
m a i n w i t h the central banks and the A m e r i c a n banking group, i n p r o -
port ion to their or ig ina l subscriptions. V o t i n g control thus lies w i t h 
the group representing G e r m a n y and the s i x m a j o r creditor countries, 
w h i c h also has operating control , through the hold ing of 16 places out 
of 25 on the B o a r d of Directors . 
S u b s e q u e n t t o the p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e Y o u n g r e p o r t c o n t a i n -
i n g a suggested outline of the B a n k , and p r i o r to the definite 
f o r m u l a t i o n of the c h a r t e r b y the o r g a n i z i n g c o m m i t t e e headed 
by M r . Jackson E . Reynolds , strong cr i t i c i sm was expressed on the 
predominance given to the seven m a j o r institutions. T h e scheme was 
characterized by the L o n d o n Times as " a close ol igarchy of the gov-
ernors of the central banks of the reparation countries . . . . i n c o n -
sistent w i t h the larger functions contemplated for the bank as an 
international reserve inst i tut ion." 
T h i s c r i t i c i sm was not well-considered and it had no effect; f o r 
the countries of the major i ty group (excepting B e l g i u m ) are eco-
nomical ly the most important nations of the globe, and without regard 
to their reparation interests w o u l d inevitably predominate i n any en-
terprise of an economic character. M o r e o v e r , any serious abuse of 
power w o u l d require consistent unanimity among the seven major 
parties, w h i c h w o u l d clearly be impossible. T h e B a n k can operate 
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only by c o m m o n consent, and this fact alone makes it inevitable that 
as the danger of abuse of power w i l l be smal l , so also w i l l the possi-
b i l i ty f o r constructive service be s low i n a r r i v i n g . 
A n o t h e r important question w h i c h was raised as to the structure 
of the B a n k related to the matter of ult imate control over the power 
of the B a n k to revise its o w n charter. It was cogently argued, notably 
i n E n g l a n d , that as a national central bank is not a sovereign power, 
but is subject, i n the last resort, l ike every other inst i tut ion, to the 
authority of the state, so an international central bank must i n the last 
resort be subject to the authority of the part ic ipating states. T h e 
polit ical control over an economic instrumentality, however, must be 
a remote one, i n order that there may be as l i tt le interference as pos-
sible i n administrat ion. 
A solution offered i n E n g l a n d , that the B a n k should be placed 
under the League of N a t i o n s , was impract ica l and i l logical . T h e 
U n i t e d States is not a member of the League, and it was necessary 
that the B a n k enjoy at least the passive approval of this country. 
M o r e than that, control by the League w o u l d be the precise opposite 
of the remote control required. F o r , the outstanding v i r tue claimed 
f o r the League lies i n the cont inuing character of its o r g a n i z a t i o n — 
its instant avai labi l i ty for conference when a pol it ical crisis arises. 
A satisfactory solution of this question was found by the or-
ganiz ing Committee by insert ing a provis ion requir ing approval by 
Swi tzer land and the founding governments of a l l amendments adopted 
by the Directors to important specified sections of the charter. T h e 
sections specified relate chiefly to the structure of the B a n k , the al lo-
cation of its capital, the restrictions on its powers and the distr ibut ion 
of its profits. U l t i m a t e pol i t ical control is thus provided, but its re-
moteness is w e l l assured. 
Broad Divisions of the Bank's Functions 
T h e objects of the B a n k , as stated i n its charter, are " to promote 
the cooperation of central banks and to provide additional facilities 
for international f inancial operat ions; and to act as trustee or agent 
i n regard to international financial settlements entrusted to it under 
agreements w i t h the parties concerned." 
T h e B a n k ' s trustee functions cover specifically those of a trustee 
appointed by Germany's creditors to receive, manage and distribute 
the reparation payments. T h i s w i l l give the B a n k plenty to do, but, 
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w i t h certain exceptions, the duties involved are of a routine nature, 
not i n v o l v i n g discretionary action. 
T h e settlement w i t h G e r m a n y amounted to a reduction of her an-
nuities f r o m a Dawes P l a n annuity (of indefinite durat ion though 
presumably not more than 37 years) of about $600,000,000 (to 
which, commencing this year, there w o u l d have been additions re-
flecting improvements i n Germany 's economic condit ion) to an aver-
age annuity under the Y o u n g P l a n of about $477,000,000, to r u n for 
59 years. A s an addit ional inducement to Germany, the annuities 
were so arranged that the early ones w i l l be relatively small , com-
mencing at $346,000,000 for the first 12 months, and r i s i n g gradu-
ally to $578,000,000 i n the 37th year, thereafter being fixed at about 
$400,000,000. E x p r e s s e d as a capital sum, the obligation may be said, 
on certain mathematical assumptions, to have been reduced f r o m about 
$10,000,000,000 to about $9,000,000,000. 
T h e chief provisions of special interest i n the p l a n — a n d these 
provisions also cal l f o r exercise of discretionary powers by the trustee 
— h a v e to do w i t h the contemplated issues of reparation bonds and 
w i t h the so-called transfer problem. 
T h e Annuities 
T h e G e r m a n annuity is split into an uncondit ional port ion set at a 
fixed amount of $157,000,000, and a postponable port ion covering 
the remainder. T h e postponable feature is devised to obviate any 
dangers to the G e r m a n currency reserves w h i c h might arise i n ex-
changing marks into foreign currencies f o r payment abroad. T h e 
possible existence of such dangers is k n o w n as the transfer problem. 
B o t h portions of the annuities are payable by G e r m a n y i n foreign 
currencies monthly to the B . I . S., but i n the case of the postponable 
annuity the foregn currency payment may be postponed on the sole 
decision of the G e r m a n government f o r not more than two years, pay-
ment being made meanwhile i n marks ( though i n the second year of 
a postponement part of the m a r k payment may also be deferred for 
one y e a r ) . 
I n case of postponement, or notification by G e r m a n y of expected 
postponement, the B a n k is required to cal l together an advisory com-
mittee, the members of w h i c h w i l l be appointed by the respective gov-
ernors of the seven pr inc ipa l institutions. T h i s committee w i l l " m a k e 
a f u l l investigation of Germany's posit ion i n regard to her obligations 
under [the] p l a n . " Its recommendations w i l l be transmitted to the 
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respective governments and to the B a n k , the approval of which w i l l 
be necessary f o r action. 
T h e establishment of this system means that G e r m a n y n o w as-
sumes the postponement prerogative ( w h i c h was never exercised) o f 
the inter-al l ied T r a n s f e r Committee set up under the Dawes P l a n s i x 
years ago. F o r the reassurance of the creditors, the G e r m a n govern-
ment declared i n the H a g u e agreement that " i t is f i rmly determined to 
make every possible effort to avoid a declaration of postpone-
ment " 
F o r their part, the experts o f the creditor powers stated i n the 
Y o u n g P l a n that they had "every reason to believe" that the total 
annuity "can i n fact be both paid and t ransferred." T h e y stated, how-
ever, that they " f u l l y respected [the] scruples" of the Germans as to 
m a k i n g themselves "uncondit ional ly responsible for any obligation 
w h i c h they are not certain is w i t h i n their power of performance i n a l l 
circumstances." A n d they admitted that over short periods difficulties 
of transfer might be encountered. 
T h e acceptance of the Y o u n g P l a n by the Germans unquestion-
ably hinged, i n a very important degree, upon this admission by the 
creditor experts of the possibi l i ty of temporary transfer difficulties, 
upon their agreeing to base a postponement clause upon it and, espe-
cial ly, upon their wil l ingness to erect an inst i tut ion of non-polit ical 
character w h i c h w o u l d automatically b r i n g special circumstances u p 
for review and have a responsible share i n any plan f o r their adjust-
ment. 
It also seems apparent that the G e r m a n experts attached great 
weight i n the transfer connection to certain other passages i n the plan. 
O n e of them referred to the possibi l i ty of assistance being rendered 
to G e r m a n y by means of temporary credits by the B a n k . A n o t h e r 
referred to the more general ult imate service of the B a n k i n opening 
u p new fields of commerce, i n w h i c h process Germany, as a part ic i -
pant, w o u l d be helped to increase her export surplus. 
T h e Transfer Problem 
T h e latter reference part icular ly might be thought to suggest 
recognition of a real transfer problem i n its only important sense o f 
a problem of a permanent, cont inuing nature. B u t i n that sense, no 
factual evidence has ever been produced to demonstrate the reality of 
the transfer problem. T h e theory of it is fallacious, and the belief 
i n i t , except i n G e r m a n and i n some E n g l i s h quarters, is now f a i r l y 
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w e l l exploded. T r a n s f e r s of great debt payments are and always 
have been automatically ensured over the major swings of trade and 
finance by one of two complementary processes—either by the export 
of a commodity surplus or i n its absence by further long-term bor-
r o w i n g abroad, ar is ing through natural processes of capital d i s t r i -
bution. 
W h a t the creditor experts subscribed to on the subject was no 
more than a reference to the r e c u r r i n g short-period strains, more or 
less regularly experienced not only i n G e r m a n y but i n every other 
country, when the foreign exchanges rise i n value on account of tem-
porar i ly increased demands f o r remittances. S u c h demands normal ly 
are due to seasonal requirements or to relatively l o w prices abroad for 
commodities and high rates abroad f o r money. 
Conceivably i n the case of Germany, or any country, such c i r -
cumstances might cal l f o r special temporary advances of fore ign 
exchange by the B . I. S. B u t such situations have long been among 
the commonplaces of international finance, and the necessary short-
swing adjustment is o r d i n a r i l y set i n m o t i o n by an increase i n the 
discount rate of the central bank concerned. I n response to the higher 
money rate, the international pool of short-term money, always o n the 
lookout f o r profitable employment, moves i n f r o m abroad. T h u s the 
supply of foreign exchange is increased. A t the same t ime domestic 
credit is contracted by the higher bank rate, domestic prices f a l l and 
the d e m a n d for f o r e i g n g o o d s is decreased. T h u s the d e m a n d for 
foreign exchange is decreased. I n this manner the fine adjustment 
of the exchanges over the short swing is made effective. 
B y this process the exportation of go ld i n exchange for foreign 
currencies is checked, and the currency reserves protected f r o m u n -
due depletion. D u r i n g the five years of the Dawes P l a n , the Reichs-
bank had no great difficulty i n so protecting its reserves, and even w i t h 
the enormous d r a w i n g power for short-term money exercised by the 
A m e r i c a n stock market, and i n the face of a fa l l ing off i n our long-
term loans to Germany, the annuities under the Dawes P l a n were 
regularly paid. 
A s s u m i n g , therefore, a certain degree of normal i ty i n economic 
affairs and international relations and ordinary good management by 
the Reichsbank, no occasion to invoke the postponement clause of the 
Y o u n g P l a n should arise. N o central bank, however, can safely ad-
minister its rate pol icy i n disregard of conditions on other money mar-
kets. Consultat ion w i t h o t h e r c e n t r a l b a n k s is essent ia l . T h e n e w 
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inst i tut ion furnishes, above a l l else, effective means f o r such consul-
tation, and it is largely i n this sense rather than i n the prospect of 
employing its funds f o r the rel ief of Germany, that the machinery 
of the B . I. S. seems l ike ly to be of importance i n connection w i t h 
reparation payments. 
T h e r e were excellent reasons w h y a controversy over a fine-spun 
point of economic theory regarding transfers should have loomed 
large i n the excissevely practical negotiations at P a r i s last year. G e r -
many was out to get her debt reduced, and France , as compensation, 
wanted a capital payment or series of capital payments arranged 
through " m o b i l i z a t i o n " of a port ion of the debt, i.e., through a sale o f 
reparation bonds to the public . 
S u c h bonds, to be marketable, had to be based on an uncondit ional 
undertaking by G e r m a n y to meet the interest and s inking f u n d charges, 
without any reservations about transfers, and France , of course, 
wanted the undertaking to cover as large a part of the obligation as 
possible. 
B u t the greater the uncondit ional annuity, i n v o l v i n g at least poten-
t ia l ly its conversion into bonds to be placed w i t h the investing public , 
the larger w o u l d become the proport ion of the debt to w h i c h G e r m a n y 
w o u l d be irrevocably tied. T h e door to any future d o w n w a r d revision 
of that part of the obligation w o u l d be definitely closed, for , short of 
revolution, no great nation ever has taken or is l i k e l y to take steps 
tending to compromise its commercial ly held external debt. 
T h u s , at P a r i s , the conflicting convictions of F r a n c e and G e r m a n y 
as to the correct economic theory of transfers were found i n practice 
strongly to support the respective interests of the two parties i n the 
matter of the size of the uncondit ional obligation. 
The Forthcoming German B o n d Issue 
A n issue of G e r m a n bonds is due to be brought out short ly i n the 
pr inc ipal amount of $300,000,000, of w h i c h $200,000,000 w i l l be a 
part ial mobi l izat ion of the reparation annuities f o r the benefit of the 
creditors and $100,000,000 w i l l be a loan f o r the benefit of the Ger-
m a n ra i lway and postal service. T h e participation of the A m e r i c a n 
market i n this issue is expected to be about $75,000,000 to $100,-
000,000. 
W h i l e the market for these bonds might be somewhat more fav-
orable i f the plans of the G e r m a n government for the reorganization 
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of its finances were further advanced, it can nevertheless be said that 
a l l these issues are well-secured. T h e annuities generally are secured 
o n the duties of the G e r m a n customs and the taxes on tobacco, beer 
and spirits . I n addit ion, the uncondit ional annuity o n w h i c h the mo-
bi l ized bonds are based is secured by the i m p o u n d i n g of a tax of equal 
amount levied o n the ra i lways , t a k i n g the place of the D a w e s P l a n 
mortgage, w h i c h is to be cancelled. T h e terms and conditions of the 
bonds w i l l be fixed by the B . I. S. 
H o w large a figure the reparation bond issues w i l l ultimately reach 
is problematical . I f bonds were issued cover ing the whole of the u n -
conditional annuity , they might amount to a total face value of $2,-
000,000,000 to $2,500,000,000, depending on the rate of interest and 
maturity . It seems certain, however, that the total issue w i l l fa l l very 
far short of any such figure a n d of the hopes of the F r e n c h i n this 
connection, for the abi l i ty of the w o r l d investment markets to take up 
G e r m a n obligations w i l l probably be f a i r l y wel l covered by G e r m a n 
industr ia l financing. Germany 's abi l i ty to pay reparations is founded 
on the fruitfulness of her industry, and that industry w i l l require 
f r o m year to year large amounts of fresh capital . A part of what 
w o u l d be Germany's n o r m a l capital accumulation w i l l be impounded 
by taxat ion to serve the reparation annuities, and unless increased 
savings are made, that part is l ike ly for many years to be brought 
back to the service of G e r m a n industry through the issuance of indus-
tr ia l obligations and their sale to foreigners. 
T o that extent G e r m a n industry w i l l be financed not by domestic 
stockholders' capital but by foreign bondholders' capital, and unless 
the reparation creditors are convinced that their best interest lies i n 
cashing i n on a part of their claims to the possible detriment of the 
remainder, the sale of reparation bonds for account of the creditors 
w i l l have to be restricted. T h i s w o u l d not preclude, however, substan-
t ia l issues of G e r m a n reparation bonds f o r conversion purposes, i.e., 
to be offered, for example, to F r e n c h citizens i n exchange f o r ob l i -
gations of their o w n treasury n o w held by them. 
I n the new reparation scheme the B a n k takes the place of the 
A g e n t General of the creditor powers at B e r l i n and of his nominal 
superior, the Reparat ion Commiss ion , at P a r i s . T h e Y o u n g P l a n 
regime sweeps away a l l other paraphernal ia of fore ign control , i n -
c luding the fore ign supervision of the ra i lways and the reparation 
mortgage on G e r m a n industry , as w e l l as the m i l i t a r y occupation o f 
the R h i n e l a n d . 
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Deliveries in K i n d to be Gradually Abolished 
C e r t a i n arti f icial arrangements involved i n the system of deliv-
eries i n k i n d w i l l also be eliminated by the gradual abolit ion of that 
system over the next ten years. T h e system was to an extent a p r o d -
uct of the m y t h of transfer difficulties, and i n so far as delivery pro-
grams d i d not fo l low usual commercia l channels they resulted i n 
abnormal displacements i n the field o f E u r o p e a n industry. T h e E n g -
l ish were convinced that this was so, part icular ly i n the case of coal 
deliveries. U n d e r the new regime, a n d as a result of M r . Snowden's 
forceful representations at the H a g u e Conference, E n g l a n d has secured 
a reduction of G e r m a n coal deliveries to I ta ly on reparation account 
and has obtained the agreement of the I ta l ian government to purchase 
for the Ital ian State rai lways 1,000,000 tons of B r i t i s h coal a year f o r 
the next three years. 
T h e transformation, so far as possible, of the conditions of a polit-
ical problem to the forms and practices of private business was one 
of the conscious objects of the Y o u n g Committee. It was a states-
manl ike object, and the spirit i n w h i c h the p lan was conceived was 
a statesmanlike spir i t . M r . Y o u n g recently said that the t e r m "rep-
arations," w h i c h possesses such a bitterly controversial background, 
was used as sparingly as possible i n the report. T h i s remark is very 
i l l u m i n a t i n g as to the temper of the m a n and the attitude of the re-
port that bears his name. T h e l iquidat ion of the reparation problem 
was to be made effective not only through transformations of sub-
stance relating to its methods and instruments, but also through ap-
peasements on the psychological and m o r a l side. 
T h e r e has been some i l l-considered talk i n this country o n the sup-
posed dangers of the commercial izat ion o f the reparation debt i n 
connection both w i t h the issuance of reparation bonds and the gradual 
t ransformat ion of the remainder of the debt into private obligations 
of G e r m a n industry . T h e substance of the outcry is contained i n the 
slogan, " T h e A m e r i c a n investor is holding the bag f o r the al l ies." 
It is true that the allies are benefited by a l l this, but the fact is, the 
A m e r i c a n taxpayer is the p r i n c i p a l beneficiary. T w o - t h i r d s of the 
reparation payments w i l l be remitted immediately to the U n i t e d States 
treasury, on account of the approximately $6,000,000,000 (present 
value of the annuities) owed by the E u r o p e a n allies to this country. 
Investor Is Not " H o l d i n g the B a g " 
It is a gross misreading of the facts, however, to suggest that the 
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investor is holding a bag for anyone at a l l . W h a t he is really d o i n g 
is invest ing to good advantage i n good securities such o f his surplus 
earnings as are not needed at home. T h i s is not to say that the h o l d -
i n g of a disproportionate amount of the commercial debt of one coun-
t r y does not present any problem at a l l f o r the U n i t e d States. U n -
doubtedly it w o u l d be better to have more diversification. B u t the 
point is that the problems connected w i t h the h o l d i n g of international 
commercial debt have nowhere near the explosive qual i ty of those i n -
volved i n the international obligations between tax-paying publics 
which the commercial debts w i l l l ittle by l i tt le take over. 
O u r real concern i n this connection arises out of the polit ical 
factors involved i n the taxpayers ' obligations, slated to continue for 
the next 59 years. T h e posit ion w h i c h the U n i t e d States occupies as 
chief ultimate creditor of G e r m a n y certainly offers food f o r thought. 
It is doubtless expedient for us to emphasize the status of the debts 
o w i n g to us as being, legally, the obligations o f the E u r o p e a n allies, 
and the collection of reparations (except f o r a smal l amount paid to 
us direct) as being, legally, for the account of the allies. O u r d i s i n -
cl inat ion to appear as the great creditor, vis-a-vis G e r m a n y as the 
great debtor, is a natural one, but i t bears no relation to the facts u n -
der ly ing the legal forms. W h a t w i l l come out of those facts is a ques-
t ion that at present cannot even be useful ly outl ined. B u t it is safe to 
say that we shall hear m u c h more of this al ignment i n the future than 
we have i n the past, and that its consequences, whatever they may 
prove to be, w i l l have great importance. 
B r o a d e r F u n c t i o n s of t h e B a n k 
T u r n i n g to the broader aspects of the B a n k ' s purposes and powers, 
we find that they include, i n part icular , the r ight to receive deposits 
f r o m central banks and others and make deposits w i t h central banks, 
to grant loans to or b o r r o w f r o m central banks on security, to discount 
or rediscount short-term obligations of p r i m e l iquidi ty , to make i n -
vestments i n negotiable securities, to buy and sell gold and exchange, 
and hold gold i n custody for central banks. T h e B a n k is also em-
powered to act as agent for any central bank and to arrange f o r any 
central bank to act as its agent. 
T h i s grant of powers, together w i t h collateral questions, has p r o -
voked intense controversy. B u t the p lan, w i t h some modifications, 
has gone ahead to final adoption without its authors feel ing i t necessary 
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to ra l ly to its defense. T h e fact is, the scheme had great inherent 
strength and c a r r y i n g power. F o r i n spite of a certain vagueness i n 
the minds of students as to precisely what the B a n k w i l l do i n prac-
tice, it is widely recognized that the increasing closeness and com-
plex i ty of international money market relationships require systematic 
cooperation between central b a n k s ; and there is general belief that no 
judgment as to the effective means of securing such cooperation could 
be more competent or responsible than the combined judgment of 
the central banks themselves. T h e important fact i n this connection 
is that the Y o u n g Committee had as its chairman a director of the 
F e d e r a l Reserve B a n k of N e w Y o r k and included i n its membership 
two directors of the B a n k of E n g l a n d , the head of the Reichsbank 
and the head of the B a n k of France . 
These men or their associates, w i t h M r . M c G a r r a h and M r . 
F r a s e r , w i l l have a predominating part i n administer ing the B . I . S. 
It is apparent f r o m the report of the Y o u n g Committee and subse-
quent expressions by indiv idua l members of it that they had a certain 
v is ion of a wide ultimate usefulness of the B a n k i n the international 
centralization of reserves, the creation of a gold settlement fund, the 
development of w o r l d trade and the stabil ization of prices. It is 
equally apparent, however, that they expect the realization of these 
ends to come about only i n natural course, when and as further ad-
vances i n the art of central b a n k i n g and an increasing sol idarity of 
w o r l d opinion may make them possible. 
T h e ends held immediately i n v iew were m u c h less spectacular. 
These ends were the creation i n corporate f o r m of a laboratory for the 
development of the art of central banking, and a c learing house f o r 
the exchange of i n f o r m a t i o n and counsel, and, more concretely, the 
establishment of a capital f u n d f o r the purpose of extending emer-
gency credits to the central banks of countries requir ing assistance i n 
restoring the gold standard or i n support ing it i n times of temporary 
strain. T h e extension of such credits as necessary w i l l constitute an 
organized method of executing the same k i n d of service as that per-
formed over the past decade by specially arranged consortiums of 
central banks, i n w h i c h the B a n k of E n g l a n d and on several occasions 
our Federal Reserve system have taken a leading part. 
Characterizat ion of the inst i tut ion as a super-bank possessing dan-
gerous powers arose i n the early public discussions of the project, 
when it was i n a formative state behind the more or less closed doors 
o f the experts' committee room. I n the final f o r m of the charter, the 
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express restrictions la id o n the powers o f the B a n k effectively dispose 
of any such idea. 
O f these prohibit ions, the most important, and also the most thor-
oughly conclusive f r o m a nationalistic standpoint, is the so-called veto 
clause, w h i c h provides that the B a n k cannot operate on any given 
market or i n any given currency i f the central bank or central banks 
directly concerned express dissent. Besides this, the B a n k may not 
issue currency notes; w h i c h means that a w o r l d currency is not con-
templated. I t is forbidden to endorse its "acceptance" on bills of ex-
change, w h i c h means that it w i l l not compete i n the profitable private 
field occupied by the acceptance bankers of L o n d o n and other centers. 
It m a y not acquire a predominant interest i n any business concern; 
w h i c h means that its part icipation i n private enterprise generally w i l l 
be held w i t h i n proper l imits . A n d finally the B a n k may not make 
advances to or open current accounts i n the names of governments, 
w h i c h precludes its direct involvement w i t h pol i t ical instrumentalities. 
U l t i m a t e E n d s 
T h e significant power of the B a n k lies i n the possession of a cap-
ital f u n d of $100,000,000 available as the basis f o r rediscounting 
operations by central banks. T h e Y o u n g Committee said that "the 
use of the B a n k ' s credit by central banks w i t h i n moderate l imits and 
over short periods may i n t ime become a n o r m a l funct ion scarcely d i f -
ferent i n its exercises f r o m the use of central bank credit by banks 
and bankers." 
T h e realization of this purpose depends on the attitude of the v a r i -
ous part ic ipat ing banks toward a general practice of periodical bor-
r o w i n g at the B . I . S., and on their faculty of calculating the credits 
thus created w i t h the B . I . S. as part of their reserves. O n the latter 
point many i f not most central banks, except our Reserve institutions, 
w o u l d be able to include their deposits w i t h the B . I. S. as part of their 
reserves. A s s u m i n g the ultimate coming into effect of a regular prac-
tice of rediscounting, an economy i n gold reserves should result. T h e 
amount of fresh bank credit capable of being created by this means 
for customers of the central banks w o u l d apparently be several times 
the amount of the capital and other cash resources available to the 
B . I . S., the precise ratio depending on the reserve policies of the 
B . I . S. itself. T h e statutes of the latter specify no definite m i n i m u m 
of cash reserves, but require that the B a n k " s h a l l be administered 
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w i t h particular regard to mainta in ing its l i q u i d i t y and f o r this purpose 
shall retain assets appropriate to the m a t u r i t y and character of its 
l iabi l i t ies ." 
A m o n g the ultimate purposes of the B a n k , the establishment of a 
gold settlement f u n d has received considerable attention. M r . T r a y l o r , 
who w i t h M r . Reynolds , constitute the A m e r i c a n representation 
of the Organizat ion Committee, thinks that this may come s o o n ; 
others disagree. W h e t h e r or not it does, it seems a relatively u n -
important though useful mechanical device for saving the cost of ship-
i n g gold. 
T h e idea that the B a n k might lend itself to schemes for the de-
velopment of so-called backward areas and the direct st imulation of 
trade projects has excited l ive ly comment and some apprehensions. 
It is of course obvious that, i n whatever countries the benefits of the 
rediscounting functions of the B a n k might be felt, those benefits w o u l d 
be reflected i n the producing and purchasing power of the countries 
concerned. B u t that any direct exploitat ion of industry or trade as 
such i n specific areas w i l l be undertaken by the B a n k appears most 
unl ikely . Seemingly the selection of the areas to be so benefited w o u l d 
alone present almost insuperable difficulties to a board of diverse na-
tionalities. T h e most plausible explanation of references i n the Y o u n g 
report to the possible opening u p of new fields of commerce, as a l -
ready mentioned w i t h relation to the transfer problem, is that they 
were the expression of a hope of D r . Schacht's, made f a m i l i a r to us 
through his frequent pronouncements on the expansion of G e r m a n 
trade and the r e t u r n of the G e r m a n colonies. I t may be observed that 
i n the definition of the objects of the B a n k appearing i n the charter, 
as already quoted, no specific ment ion is made of trade development. 
N o r is there any mention i n the charter of stabil ization of prices. 
T h i s problem is as yet only very vaguely defined, and its solution is 
presumably far i n the future. Substantial accomplishment i n that 
direction must depend on the development of the science of economics 
and the art of central banking general ly ; and predictions as to the part 
that the new bank might play i n it would be highly speculative. 
A certain weeding out of the controversy over the new bank is 
possible when one appreciates that m u c h of i t reflects merely current 
controversy on the theory and practice of central b a n k i n g generally, 
and raises no new questions. T h o u g h many o f the problems o f cen-
tra l banking are s t i l l unsolved, and some of its broader ends are st i l l 
only d i m l y outl ined, this should cause no misgivings i n connection 
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w i t h the creation of the new international unit . The essential things 
are that the control of the new bank should be safeguarded f r o m 
abuse and its powers adequately restr ic ted; and both o f these condi-
tions have been realized. 
O u r Relation to the Bank 
O u r Reserve banks w i l l not participate i n this inst i tution. T h e 
or ig inal announcement of this pol icy by the Secretary of State placed 
the decision on the understandable g r o u n d that " this government does 
not desire to have any A m e r i c a n official, directly or indirect ly , par-
ticipate i n the collection of G e r m a n reparations through the agency 
of this bank or otherwise." 
Other grounds of opposition to the part ic ipat ion of our Reserve 
B a n k s have been expressed by certain commentators. These are 
based largely on fears of undue E u r o p e a n influence i n the determina-
t ion of F e d e r a l Reserve discount rates and credit policies. S u c h a 
v iew does scant justice to the intellectual and m o r a l calibre of our 
banking authorities. I t is , moreover, founded on a too commonly 
accepted fal lacy that what is good f o r E u r o p e is bad f o r us. 
T h e dangers foreseen by those who accept this v i e w are supposed 
to be connected w i t h the practice of l o w e r i n g our rediscount rate to 
ease the strain on the E u r o p e a n exchanges. T h e classic example cited 
is the l o w e r i n g of the rate i n 1927, fo l lowed as it was by the great 
upswing of our stock market. B u t the lower ing of the rate on that 
occasion, as w o u l d always be the case, had a dual purpose, w h i c h was 
not only to strengthen the E u r o p e a n exchanges, but also and thereby 
to stimulate our o w n exports and industry generally. 
T h a t this cheapening of money also caused the b u l l market is 
highly dubious economic reasoning; for subsequent experience showed 
that h igh interest rates could not dampen the enthusiasm of a specu-
lation-crazed public. The b u l l market was b o r n of a spectacular i n -
dustrial expansion, it fed on the cupidi ty and self-delusion of a vast 
new a r m y of speculators, and, whi le the mania persisted, it was of 
itself a major economic force that could not be denied. M o n e y rates 
d i d not make the b u l l m a r k e t ; on the contrary, the b u l l market made 
money rates. 
T h o u g h our Reserve system w i l l not participate i n the new bank, 
co-operation w i t h the bank and its central bank members i n the mat-
ter of money rates and otherwise w i l l s t i l l be necessary. T h e eco-
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nomic facts that require such co-operation will still exist. A better 
public understanding of those facts would effectively dispose of much 
ill-considered criticism of Federal Reserve policies. The broad truth 
is that economic forces so interlock that what is sound policy with re-
gard to our foreign trade and investment interests is also sound policy 
with regard to our domestic affairs. 
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